Negotiating the 'trading zone'. Creating a shared information infrastructure in the Dutch public safety sector by Boersma, F.K. et al.
Volume 9, Issue 2 2012 Article 6
Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management
Negotiating the ‘Trading Zone’. Creating a
Shared Information Infrastructure in the Dutch
Public Safety Sector .
Kees Boersma, VU University Amsterdam
Pieter Wagenaar, VU University Amsterdam
Jeroen Wolbers, VU University Amsterdam
Recommended Citation:
Boersma, Kees; Wagenaar, Pieter; and Wolbers, Jeroen (2012) "Negotiating the ‘Trading Zone’.
Creating a Shared Information Infrastructure in the Dutch Public Safety Sector .," Journal of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 6.
DOI: 10.1515/1547-7355.1965 
©2012 De Gruyter. All rights reserved.
Brought to you by | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Authenticated | 130.37.129.78
Download Date | 10/30/13 11:37 AM
Negotiating the ‘Trading Zone’. Creating a
Shared Information Infrastructure in the Dutch
Public Safety Sector .
Kees Boersma, Pieter Wagenaar, and Jeroen Wolbers
Abstract
Our main concern in this article is whether nation-wide information technology (IT)
infrastructures or systems in emergency response and disaster management are the solution to
the communication problems the safety sector suffers from. It has been argued that implementing
nation-wide IT systems will help to create shared cognition and situational awareness among relief
workers. We put this claim to the test by presenting a case study on the introduction of ‘netcentric
work’, an IT system-based platform aiming at the creation of situational awareness for professionals
in the safety sector in the Netherlands. The outcome of our research is that the negotiation with
relevant stakeholders by the Dutch government has lead to the emergence of several fragmented
IT systems. It becomes clear that a top-down implementation strategy for a single nation-wide
information system will fail because of the fragmentation of the Dutch safety sector it is supposed
to be a solution to. As the US safety sector is at least as fragmented as its Dutch counterpart, this
may serve as a caveat for the introduction of similar IT systems in the US.
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Introduction 
 
When a major disaster strikes, many different organizations are called to respond. 
The amount of distress the disaster causes creates multiple interdependencies 
between the involved organizations that need to be coordinated in a multi-layered 
governance system. Police, medical teams and fire services handle direct relief 
efforts, while governmental agencies and public organizations deal with tasks, 
such as disseminating information about the disaster to the public, arranging 
shelters, and taking care of administrative processes. Citizens and private 
organizations collaborate on an ad-hoc basis to support the relief effort. In the 
complex, dynamic and uncertain scenario of the disaster, the full scope of 
operations remains fuzzy, as new actors continue to enter the scene (Kapucu 
2009). As a consequence of the distress caused by the disaster multiple 
uncertainties arise, such as ‘what hazards are present; the precise nature of the 
incident; unpredictable chains of events; unexpected consequences of the 
incident; the potential for progressive collapse of systems; lack of clarity about 
other organizations’ capabilities and actions; and the factors in the background of 
the community that may complicate the response’ (Cook 2009, 4–5). 
A major problem during massive relief efforts is the poor cooperation 
between the involved organizations: overview, adequate organizational 
coordination, and effective communication are often lacking. Keeping situational 
awareness and insight in the continuously changing environment is one of the 
toughest challenges emergency management organizations face (Gorman et al. 
2006), but highly necessary: only with situational awareness—that is, a clear 
perception of the events and developments of a particular disaster within a 
particular volume of time and space (Endsley 1995) - can the first responders act 
adequately, work together and share relevant information with each other. 
A good example of the organizational complexity is the 456 organizations 
involved in emergency management during the aftermath of the 9/11 WTC 
attacks (Comfort and Kapucu 2006). The magnitude of interactions and 
continuous adaptation such organizations engage in makes ‘the effective 
mobilization of response to extreme events on a large scale one of the least 
understood problems in public management’ (Comfort and Kapucu 2006, 311). 
Under the dynamic circumstances at times of disaster, emergency response 
organizations -characterized by a bureaucratic nature - often lack cognition and 
situational awareness to ensure coordination. The question is how the requested 
collaboration can be achieved, given that the amount and variety of organizations 
involved at the time of a disaster makes a shared situational awareness difficult. 
One particular IT infrastructure that has been introduced in many countries 
- including the Netherlands - as a possible solution to shared situational awareness 
is Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC), a concept from the military (Perry et al. 
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2002; Fewell and Hazen 2003; Houghton et al. 2006; Houghton et al. 2008). NEC 
was offered as the new paradigm to help communication, coordination and control 
through offering situational awareness. Interestingly, this concept has been 
introduced in the civil safety sector where it is perceived to be more than just a 
new technology, but also a promising new way to organize information sharing 
practices (Von Lubitz et al. 2008; Moynihan 2009). 
The idea is that netcentric work can break through the established, 
bureaucratic and hierarchical patterns of command and control (Moynihan 2009), 
by improving the exchange of information between heterogeneous actors involved 
in crisis and emergency management, and thus creating a common operational 
picture at times of incidents (Mendonça et al. 2007). In a way, netcentric work is 
supposed to enable networks of communication within a bureaucratic 
environment. It is envisaged that netcentric work, by linking individuals and their 
distributed networks, will—through the rapid and timely sharing of information—
create widespread shared understanding of a situation that will in turn allow 
swifter actions based on better-informed decisions (Houghton et al. 2006). 
Netcentric work, in other words, is seen as a promising new way of working, 
enabled by a technological infrastructure, that is supposed to create situational 
awareness and a possibility for improving response. 
The central question in this article is whether a world as fragmented as the 
safety sector can create the joint communication infrastructure of netcentric work 
that is required to enable shared situational awareness at times of disasters. 
In answering this question, we focus on the likelihood of success of the 
Dutch Department of Interior’s efforts to introduce such a joint information 
structure for emergency management organizations in the Netherlands. Although 
the Dutch case of introducing a joint information structure has some 
particularities, we believe it offers insights that are valuable for the international 
debate on creating an information infrastructure and shared situational awareness 
in disasters. First of all, the Dutch safety sector is complex and highly fragmented, 
given the fact that there are – currently – 25 safety regions each of which is, as an 
administrative body, responsible for the quality of the risk management and the 
emergency response. Secondly, as we will show in this article, new information 
technology (IT) infrastructures or systems have been introduced in the 
Netherlands in order to facilitate shared situational awareness. 
In what follows, we first make an in-depth theoretical analysis of the 
processes of negotiation about the information infrastructure. This discussion 
includes a reflection upon the governmental, central actor’s implementation 
instruments. Next, we will describe the features of the Dutch civil safety sector, 
and outline the technological solutions that the Department of the Interior has 
been trying to introduce. Finally, we end by questioning the possibility for success 
of imposing a (national) standard for the information infrastructure, and a plea for 
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a more flexible, locally rooted solution for the implementation and actual 
functioning of the information infrastructure. 
Before we start the reader must consider that emergency management 
organizations have to deal with many different kinds of scenarios, such as 
incidents (accidents, riots, fires etc.), large public manifestations (crowd control) 
and disasters (natural or man-made). In the remainder of this article we will 
mainly refer to emergencies as an encompassing term for these different 
scenarios. 
 
Implementing IT-solutions for Shared Situational Awareness 
 
Rethinking Nation-wide Emergency Response Infrastructures 
 
Research on the coordination problem between a large number of organizations 
involved in emergency response frequently identifies information technology as 
part of the solution; that is, technology is supposed to enable the creation of 
shared situational awareness. In the Public Administration Review special issue of 
December 2007, Comfort introduced a framework based on 4 C’s - Cognition, 
Communication, Coordination and Control - to address the need for ‘a nationwide 
information infrastructure that would facilitate the development of a common 
operating picture in extreme events’ (Comfort 2007, 196). Comfort states that 
implementing proper information technologies is the key to overcoming problems 
with cognition and coordination. ‘Without a well-defined, functioning information 
infrastructure supported by appropriate technology, the collective response of a 
community exposed to serious threat will fail’ (Comfort 2007, 196–197). In a 
special issue of Information System Frontiers on advances in multi-agency 
disaster management, a similar call for ‘technological innovations’ or 
‘interagency information sharing systems’ as a solution to the challenges and 
obstacles in disaster management operations is voiced (Janssen et al. 2010, 2; 
Bharosa et al. 2010, 59). Also in the Journal of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management, the need for improved situational awareness through 
enhanced information technology is voiced (Johnson, Zagorecki, Gelman, 
Comfort 2011; Kiltz and Smith 2011; Hsu, Chambers, Herbold, Calcote, Ryczak, 
DeFraites 2010). Not only the scientific community believes that an IT 
infrastructure is an important enabler for the creation of shared situational 
awareness at times of disaster: practitioners in the civil safety sector believe the 
same. 
Yet, critical reflections are made as well, for example by Mendonça, 
Jefferson, and Harrald (2007). They fear that the demand to achieve shared 
situational awareness (with the help of standard procedures and systems) 
constrains the emergency organizations’ agility needed for flexible adaptation and 
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improvisation. Moreover, Perrow (2007) argues that coordination in large 
organizational - ‘mammoth’ - structures, such as large IT infrastructures, cannot 
be achieved by centralization; rather, decentralized systems are needed to 
incorporate the diverse tasks and skills involved in disaster response. Analysis of 
federal and local interorganizational networks during the Katrina response efforts 
confirms this argument, as it is found that more investments should be made at the 
local level to support disaster response (Kapucu, Arslan and Collins 2010). 
Next to the question of whether a nation-wide IT infrastructure is desirable 
in disaster response, there is the question of whether implementation of such a 
system is at all possible. We think that the wide spread belief that technology is 
the solution to overcome coordination problems in emergency management, 
through the creation of situational awareness between organizations involved in 
the response phase, needs to be questioned. One might argue that the creation of 
situational awareness between teams operating in different locations might be 
challenging, but also the implementation of such an IT system in itself is 
challenging. 
In this respect, there are three separate debates that consider the complex 
nature of developing a common infrastructure. First of all, inter-organizational 
systems (IOS) scholars made us aware of the inter-organizational coordination 
problems as a result of the heterogeneity of organizations involved in developing 
common IT infrastructures (for the IOS debate for example see: Schooley and 
Horan 2007; Fedorowicz, Gogan & Williams 2007; Williams, Dias Fedorowicz, 
Jacobson, Vilvovsky, Sawyer and Tyworth 2009). Secondly, the inter-
governmental relations literature has taught us just how problematic centralization 
is (Wright 1988; 1990; Fleurke and Willemse 2004). Finally, the network 
governance literature argues that coordination should be sought in networked 
steering instead of applying top-down measurements (Provan and Milward 2001; 
Provan and Kenis 2007; Moynihan 2009). 
These debates have shown that the implementation and governance of one 
centralized information infrastructure is very hard to realize. We need to consider 
that, at a time of a disaster, a well-defined IT infrastructure such as netcentric 
work only makes sense if all the organizations want to become part of that 
infrastructure and internalize new ways of working. Given these debates and 
insights, how has the Dutch Department of the Interior gone about implementing 
its netcentric information system? 
 
Steering Mechanisms: Sticks, Carrots, Hugs and Trading Zones 
 
In order to understand how the various actors in the fragmented Dutch safety 
sector have responded and are likely to respond in the future to efforts to 
introduce netcentric work, we need to realize that in principle a policy maker - 
4 JHSEM: Vol. 9 [2012], No. 2, Article 6
Brought to you by | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Authenticated | 130.37.129.78
Download Date | 10/30/13 11:37 AM
and the Netherlands Department of the Interior is no exception - has, roughly 
speaking, three kinds of policy instruments at its disposal to push netcentric work 
through. Following Boulding’s work on the faces of power these are ‘destructive 
power’ based on coercion (the stick), ‘economic power’ on the basis of exchange 
(the carrot) and ‘integrative power’ (the hug) (Boulding 1989: 10, 24-31; 
compare: Etzioni 1961, 5-6; Hood 1983; Vedung 1998). Applied to the process 
under study, using the stick would mean adopting a law to force the safety sector 
to comply with the Department of the Interior, and to adopt and implement a 
particular netcentric work standard. Using the carrot would mean inducing the 
safety sector to comply with the ministry’s wishes by financial means. Finally, 
using integrative power would be to create legitimacy for the netcentric solution. 
The latter is based upon the power to, in Boulding’s terms, create relationships, 
and in this Dutch case comes down to calling a ‘Platform Netcentric Work’ into 
being in 2008, where all actors involved can discuss what they believe to be 
netcentric work. 
Yet, when the Department of the Interior uses the ‘hug’, to create the 
‘Platform Netcentric Work’, it only creates so-called ‘frontstage networks’ 
(compare Goffman 1959) in which the involved (and invited!) actors formally 
meet each other to discuss - in our case - the technical and organizational features 
of netcentric work. However, the issue of power in social relationships is more 
complex. Power always takes place in interaction and in more ‘hidden’ social 
interactions (e.g. Lukes 1974; Clegg et al. 2006); that is why we have to move 
away from the somewhat naive idea, that it is the Department of the Interior that 
can ‘decide’ on its own whether or not to use the stick, the carrot and/or the ‘hug’. 
Boulding’s three faces of power gives (too much) credit to the individual and/or 
individual organization, critics have argued. It is a rather voluntaristic view of 
power (Hardy and Clegg 1996). Therefore we need to also study possible 
‘backstage networks’, not created by the Department of the Interior, where 
important decisions might be taken. It is the dynamics in the backstage networks, 
we feel, that are important for understanding how netcentric work will be adopted 
and implemented, if at all. 
It is crucial to study these backstage networks, because netcentric work is 
anything but a clear and unambiguous concept. It is, to borrow a term from Pinch 
and Bijker, subject to ‘interpretative flexibility’ (Pinch and Bijker 1984), meaning 
that, although there are some predefined notions, the question of what the 
characteristics of netcentric work precisely are or should be is the outcome of 
negotiations, (local) choices and political debates. The fragmented nature of the 
safety sector networks is not an easy environment to implement one (technical) 
standard for a concept that is subject to interpretative flexibility. As a 
consequence, the concept of netcentric work is translated and negotiated 
constantly (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996) by the relevant actors. This process 
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involves a) the fashion of netcentric work within the international (academic and 
practitioners’) community of first responders, b) netcentric work locally translated 
into action, and c) netcentric work becoming enacted in local practices. 
The ‘Platform Netcentric Work’, created by the Department of the 
Interior’s ‘hugs’, where the process of translation and negotiation takes place, is 
similar to what Vaughan (1999) would call ‘trading zones’ (1999, 918, 922-4; see 
also Galison 1997). In these trading zones heterogeneous partners discuss the 
meaning of the new (technological) concept of netcentric work. In her study on 
the Challenger disaster (1986), Vaughan found that at NASA trading zones were 
places where the different parties involved in the launch of the space-shuttle tried 
to reach agreement on what had to be done, and where they attempted to create a 
common language to understand possible controversies. However, at NASA the 
unintended consequence of these trading zones was ‘groupthink’ (cf. Mehalik and 
Gorman 2006). Too many actors involved in the launch of the space-shuttle kept 
their professional blinkers on making them blind to alternative solutions. 
Naturally, NASA also had ‘backstage trading zones’, but the creation of 
frontstage trading zones meant that backstage networks, which could have 
functioned as platforms to recognize local variations and actions, were overlooked 
or ignored (Vaughan 1999). 
We will use the four concepts of sticks, carrots, hugs and trading zones to 
analyze the instruments the Dutch Department of the Interior uses to facilitate the 
implementation of netcentric work, whilst, at the same time, questioning whether 
or not there is room for local initiatives and variations. There is, at least at the 
level of rhetoric, some convergence of ideas and policies with regard to the 
concept of netcentric work. Yet, at the same time, it is a challenge for those 
involved in the process of (re)developing the concept to find common ground for 
understanding the principles of netcentric work and to break away from the idea 
of networks being imposed at the frontstage. 
 
Methods 
 
This research is based on data collected from February 2008 to  December 2010 
and after, during a research project on multidisciplinary information management 
in emergency response rooms, in which we were alerted to a new development 
called ‘netcentric work’ in the Dutch safety regions. We followed this pre-
implementation policy development in 2008 and intensified research in the period 
from February 2009 through December 2010, during which the actual 
implementation process of netcentric work in the safety regions started. This 
paper is the outcome of an ongoing research into emergency response in the 
Netherlands under the heading of Amsterdam Research on Emergency 
Administration (AREA: http://www.area-vu.nl/). We continued our research on 
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netcentric work in 2011 and 2012 (this article was under review in the Winter of 
2011-2012). From July 2011 – January 2012 we did an in-depth study into the 
multi-disciplinary coordination practices (including the use of the netcentric work 
system) co-funded by the project Netcentric Work (since early 2012 a project 
organization of the Netherlands Institute for Safety). Although the main focus of 
that research was on the emergency response culture, it was also a means to 
validate the outcomes of our 2009-2010 research. 
The data in the 2009-2010 period were collected in semi-structured 
interviews with respondents who were involved with the development of 
netcentric work and by observations during the Platform Netcentric Work 
meetings. We attended three of these meetings in 2009, and 2010 during which 
we had informal conversations with many officials and attendants from different 
safety regions and other professional organizations, and we performed 
participative observations. 
Interviews were conducted in 15 of the 25 safety regions, which were 
selected by looking at geographical characteristics of urban, rural and border 
regions. Five regions were selected in each category to get a deeper understanding 
of the environment the regions are responsible for. This sample of 15 regions 
provides a good overview on the situation in the Netherlands, as these types cover 
most of the possible risk profiles the regions need to prepare for (see table 1 
below). The risk profiles of these different areas call for different types of 
emergency preparation, expertise and resources. In urban areas (including airports 
and harbors) these include large traffic accidents, fires and chemical accidents; in 
rural areas mostly forest/nature fires; and in border regions the collaboration with 
foreign emergency services. 
 
Table 1 Selection of Safety Regions 
Urban  Rural Border Region 
Amsterdam-Amstelland Gelderland-Midden Zuid-Limburg 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond Gelderland Zuid Limburg-Noord 
Utrecht Brabant-Noord Gelderland-Zuid 
Hollands-Midden Zaanstreek-Waterland Twente 
Zuid-Holland-Zuid Gooi & Vechtstreek Noord-Oost Gelderland 
 
Interviews were conducted with twenty senior emergency managers who were 
involved in the implementation of netcentric work in each safety region (all of 
them had at least 5 years+ experience with emergency response organizations), 
and managers of eight different emergency response rooms. On top of that we 
went to the emergency control rooms of the Military Police at Schiphol Airport, to 
the safety control room of the Dutch Railways, the control room of the Royal 
Dutch Touring Club (the Dutch Automobile Association) and the control room of 
the international security company G4S in Amsterdam. Although the visits to the 
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latter organizations were meant to understand emergency control room practices, 
we also took the opportunity to ask the control room managers about their ideas 
with regard to netcentric operations. 
In order to understand the perspective of the Dutch government, we spoke 
to administrators in management functions at the Department of the Interior (we 
spoke with four different department officials during three occasions). We went to 
the different (semi) governmental organizations who are – each in their own right 
– responsible for the execution of the Departments’ policy. We talked to various 
project managers of the ‘Project Netcentric Work’ and the ‘Platform Netcentric 
Work’ (in total we interviewed seven project managers), one instructor of the 
Police Academy of the Netherlands, four instructors of the Netherlands Institute 
for Safety and two inspectors of the Public Order and Safety Inspectorate. Finally, 
we interviewed fourteen external consultants from six different companies (M&I 
Partners, TNO, CapGemini, Berenschot, Centric and Thales) who were involved 
in implementation processes of netcentric work and the IT environment of it. 
These interviews provide a useful source of information to validate the interviews 
and talks we had with the professionals of the different safety regions. 
Interviews focused on the tasks of each respondent, on their experiences 
with implementing netcentric work in their own organization/region, and on 
implementation processes in other regions. Semi-structured interviews were used 
to gather data on the experiences of respondents with netcentric work. Each 
interview included the following topics: what one believes to be netcentric work, 
the current status of netcentric work, and the historical development and future 
development/scenarios of netcentric work. Data were analyzed by coding 
transcripts of recorded interviews and comparing findings on these topics. 
To increase reliability of the analysis we discussed the findings of these 
topics to categorize the data and discuss possible theoretically driven 
interpretations of the data. During this process we went back and forth from the 
codes, categories and conceptual explanations to critically reflect on our thoughts 
and to develop the connection between the data and theoretical interpretations. 
Additional documentation was used for contextual analysis, such as incident 
reports of the Inspectorate Public Order and Safety and the Dutch Safety Board, 
and documents that described the implementation process in different regions. 
Finally, since 2009 we organize an annual meeting with professionals from the 
different safety regions to present our results and to ask for response from the 
field under the heading of the AREA research group in Amsterdam. We’ve 
organized three of these meetings in the period 2009-2012. 
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The concept of ‘Netcentric work’ in the Netherlands 
 
In 1995 the Dutch government took the initiative to implement a single national 
communication network for the police, fire brigades and first aid teams, called 
C2000 (Wagenaar et al. 2009). Recent national disasters - such as the explosion in 
a firework factory in May 2000 in the town of Enschede that killed 23 people and 
injured about 950, and the fire in a Volendam café on New Years Eve of 2001 
that killed 14 teenagers and injured about 180 - had put safety and the governance 
of safety on top of the political agenda (Helsloot 2007). Yet, communication and 
information-sharing between the various professional groups and the creation of a 
shared understanding of what is going on at times of disasters remained a problem 
(Oosting 2001). For that reason, the Dutch government was looking for additional 
means to overcome this problem. 
Netcentric work came up as a solution to enable collective situational 
awareness at times of emergencies (Van Lier 2009). At the Dutch Ministry of 
Defense there was enough experience with netcentric operations - e.g. during 
military operations in the Middle East - to convince the Department of the Interior 
to introduce this technology to the civil sector (Remkes and Kamp 2006). In the 
civil sector it was meant to improve the exchange of information between 
heterogeneous actors involved in crisis and emergency management. 
It was the national crisis management system Cedric developed by the 
Dutch organization for technology transfer and knowledge for business (TNO), 
that was advocated as the best technical standard by the Department of the 
Interior. Cedric is a software package that includes all the elements for building a 
common operational picture. It has a text and a map section, in which information 
about the emergency can be inserted and shared. In the text section, based on the 
former police program Multi-Team, situational reports can be arranged in folders 
and relay information, such as the amount of victims, the presence of hazardous 
materials, the locations of fire hoses, the medical units available, and the actions 
and decisions of operational leaders. In the map section, based on the military 
program Integrated Staff Information System (ISIS), icons can be placed that 
resemble emergency service units, road blocks, waypoints, wind direction, and the 
expected development of scenarios, such as a flooding. This information is 
entered into the system and is simultaneously shared with all responders that have 
access to the Cedric system. Figure 1 and 2 are examples of the interface of 
Cedric - the technical standard of netcentric work. 
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Figure 1. First examples of the Cedric System in-use. The example shows information exchange 
during an exercise about a metro accident in Rotterdam. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Second example of the Cedric System in-use. This example shows the Geographical 
Incident Map of an area affected by flooding during an exercise. 
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A fragmented Safety Response Sector 
 
Given the complex nature of emergencies, the safety response sector - in which 
netcentric work is being introduced - is subject to fragmentation. The 
fragmentation of the safety response sector takes place at, at least, two levels. 
In the first place, the emergency itself creates a complex system of 
interdependencies between organizations (in)directly affected by the emergency. 
The distress caused by the emergency affects many private and public 
organizations and civilian groups, such as private oil companies, infrastructure 
companies, public transportation agencies, public utility companies, water boards 
and even spontaneously emerging civilian groups organizing themselves through 
social networking sites (e.g. Lutz and Lindell 2008). Each of these organizations 
has its own emergency response structure that becomes active once a crisis 
situation emerges. There are clear interdependencies between these organizations, 
but little formal structures in place to coordinate this interdependency. The 
emergent coordination processes enacted by different organizations at the same 
time and the lack of shared situational awareness brings a fragmented system into 
being in which organizations have no clear view of what interdependencies exist 
and how different organizations take different actions to solve the problems 
caused by the emergency. The lack of formalized structures causes coordination 
to take place on an ad-hoc basis. 
In the second place, the fragmentation and ambiguity (Martin 2002) in the 
response system is situated at the administrative level (compare Comfort 2007). 
The organization of the Dutch safety sector itself can be characterized as a 
fragmented world (Boersma et al. 2009). In this, the Dutch situation is no 
different from other countries such as the US or the UK (see Coaffee et al. 2009 
on the UK). Since the early 1980s Dutch mayors have been in charge of 
municipal emergency management operations (Scholtens 2008). In the 
Netherlands there are at present 421 municipalities, each one responsible for 
preparedness and disaster response in their jurisdiction. At the next level, the 
provincial government has been in charge of examining the activities of the mayor 
and assessing the municipal disaster preparation and prevention plans. In case of a 
large emergency, a provincial coordination center would be created. At the 
national level, the Department of the Interior has been responsible for generating 
the laws and rules, the testing of the quality of the emergency response chain, the 
financing of part of the regional costs, and taking care of additional facilities for 
large response operations, such as communication systems, public alarm systems 
and heavy equipment (Wagenaar et al. 2009). Next to the administrative 
responsibility, representatives of the ministries had a seat in the National 
Coordination Center during large incidents. The Dutch sector is still largely 
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organized in this way, except for the official introduction in 2010 of the so-called 
safety regions, meant to combat this fragmentation. 
 
Safety Regions 
 
The decentralization of the Dutch safety sector began to frustrate inter-municipal 
coordination efforts during several disasters in the Netherlands - notably the 
disasters in Enschede and Volendam - and thus the decision was made (in 2010) 
to organize the Fire Department and Medical Services into twenty-five safety 
regions geographically similar to the twenty-five police regions that already 
existed (see figure 3 below). The rationale for this division was to create equal 
public bodies on the regional level, that should improve coordination during 
preparation and response. The safety regions are new public bodies that house 
both the Fire Department and Medical Services. In addition, the safety regions are 
responsible for the organization of emergency response rooms, the technical 
equipment of the first responders and a functioning system of information 
management when emergencies occur. 
The recognition of the safety regions as public bodies gives them 
administrative and decision-making power, and their own funding. However, 
municipal influence is still present, since the mayors officially remain in charge of 
the emergency management operations. That is why the board of directors of the 
safety regions consists of the mayors of the involved municipalities. One can 
argue that, in this way, the safety sector is organized at four levels: municipal, 
regional, provincial and national, each with their own independent administrative 
powers. 
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Figure 3: the official map of the 25 Safety Regions (in Dutch Veiligheidsregio’s) in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Implementing Netcentric Work as a Solution to the Lack of Organizational 
Coordination 
 
On the front stage of the implementation of netcentric work the Department of the 
Interior has, as already stated, three policy instruments at its disposal to influence 
the safety regions: the stick, the carrot and the hug. In the following empirical 
analysis we will show how the Dutch Department of the Interior has used these 
three instruments to influence the implementation of netcentric work. 
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The Stick 
 
Once the decision for the national roll-out of NEC was made by the Dutch 
Department of the Interior, the question who would lead the national 
implementation naturally emerged. Until the NEC project, the history of Dutch 
emergency management organizations was generally marked by expanded 
decentralization with the realization of large-scale projects, which resulted in a 
proliferation of IT systems. To prevent this from happening again, the Department 
of the Interior took a leading position in co-ordinating the national roll-out. 
The first step in this co-ordinating role was to draft a law that would create 
a framework for the overall quality standards for the safety regions, including 
netcentric work as a means for improving the information management 
capabilities. The basic framework in the law needed to provide enough direction 
for the safety regions to translate the Department of the Interior’s legal demands 
into actual policy implementations. 
By putting references to these quality standards into a law the Department 
of the Interior had the stick in its hands by which it could force the safety regions 
to comply with its standards. Yet, the reference to the quality measures itself 
lacked the precision necessary to back up the leading position of the Department 
of the Interior. The law on the safety regions does not define the concept of 
netcentric work, nor its standards. Hence, the law proved to give too little 
direction on how to maintain the information exchange facilities and left 
sufficient room for the safety regions to organize their own standards. Regions 
could still choose their own way of implementing netcentric work. 
 
The Carrot 
 
The second step taken by the Department of the Interior to reinforce the 
implementation of the netcentric standards in the safety regions was to provide a 
full software package to enable netcentric work, Cedric. As we have seen, Cedric 
combines the Integrated Staff Information System (ISIS) - a geographic 
information system in use by the Dutch military - and Multi-team - a text-based 
police system for information sharing. 
To give more momentum to the implementation, the national steering 
group provided Cedric for free. Yet, things looked more promising than they 
actually were for the safety regions. Their use of Cedric was subject to a clause 
which stated that the Department of the Interior would only pay the 
implementation and maintenance costs for the first year; after that the system 
would cost 15€ct per inhabitant per year. Costs for just the software would 
therefore be approximately €40.000 per year for the smaller regions, and up to 
€180.000 per year for the larger ones. Combined with the license costs for the use 
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of the maps and training of personnel, total operation costs would be almost 
double the software costs. 
Initially Cedric looked like a cheap solution for enabling emergency 
management in the regions, and a good reason to comply quickly with the 
national standards of information management. The adoption of Cedric turned out 
to be rather costly, however. The Department of the Interior’s economic incentive 
was critically judged by several safety regions, and some decided to build and 
maintain their own software system. 
 
The hug 
 
The third and last instrument in the hands of the Department of the Interior was 
that of integrative power or ‘the hug’. In order to overcome the fragmented safety 
landscape, the Department of the Interior decided to establish the ‘Platform 
Netcentric Work’, at which professionals, policy makers, technicians, advisors, 
knowledge workers and other relevant actors, could meet each other regularly to 
discuss the features of netcentric work. The first meeting was held in September 
2008. During this meeting a civil servant from the Department of the Interior 
announced, via a video-message, that the platform was meant to support the safety 
regions in the development and implementation of netcentric work. Although he 
recommended the regions to implement the Department of the Interior software, 
Cedric, he also said that the Platform would do justice to other operating practices 
that had already been adopted in the regions. For him, the Platform was an enabler 
in bringing insights from theory and practice together. 
Since the first meeting, the members of the Platform have shared their 
ideas, exchanged information about best practices and discussed implementation 
strategies. In early 2010, the 25 safety regions committed themselves to the 
implementation of netcentric work by signing a formal agreement with the 
Department of the Interior. Nonetheless, it is still up to the individual safety 
regions to decide about the way netcentric work will be introduced and which 
technical standard will be adopted. The Dutch safety sector might end up with 
various versions of netcentric work as a result of the agreement. 
The platform is an instrument used by the Department of the Interior 
intended to provide the safety sector with a common goal and a collectively 
shared idea about netcentric work; it is also intended to energize the 
organizations. It truly is what Vaughan would call a ‘trading zone’ (Vaughan 
1999) where the various actors involved actively give meaning, not just to the 
implementation process, but to the entire concept of netcentric work. 
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Translation and Enactment of Netcentric Work: Early Adopters, Laggards 
and Followers 
 
What is important to notice is that the Platform functions as, what we called, a 
front-stage network, created by the Department of the Interior to steer and control 
the implementation and actual use of netcentric work. As we have indicated, the 
actions and negotiations that take place in the context of a front-stage network, 
such as the ‘Platform Netcentric Work’, are not free from politics. Quite the 
opposite. The Department of the Interior has been advocating - in a subtle way - 
Cedric as the technical standard for netcentric work, whereas, as we will see in 
more detail below, some safety regions had already implemented other standards 
before the creation of the platform. As we will also see, there is competition 
between different IT-systems, and the Department of the Interior has no steering 
function towards the way NEC is developed and implemented. It only provides 
the basic system Cedric. 
One of our interviewees states the problem: ‘[T]here is no resistance from 
the regions to the idea of NEC, but how it should be organized is a different 
subject’. Another interviewee explains why: ‘The safety regions are to a certain 
extent autonomous, because they have the financial means to act on their own. 
The Department of the Interior can give one possible solution, but the regions can 
always choose to take another path’. Unsurprisingly, then, the Department of the 
Interior is an important driver behind the introduction of netcentric work in the 
Dutch safety regions, but it is not the only one. As it happens, some regions had 
started with something closely resembling netcentric work before the Department 
of the Interior had even introduced the term. If we look at the way the regions 
have adopted netcentric work, we find we can plot them on a continuum, in line 
with Rogers’ ideas of innovation diffusion (1983), ranging from early adopters, to 
followers, to laggards. 
 
Early adopters 
 
Some safety regions were already introducing netcentric work before the 
Department of the Interior had even started to think about it. Hence, alternative 
information systems were already at hand before the Department of the Interior’s 
policy on the matter materialized. For example, the safety region Gelderland-
Midden already had a project with a large software company, only to learn later 
that the project its local entrepreneurs had been working on was elsewhere known 
as netcentric work. The complete netcentric information system it developed is 
called ‘Eagle One’. It is much easier to operate than Cedric and is also more 
advanced, so it is claimed. Gelderland-Midden theoretically runs the risk of 
having to abandon its system if use of Cedric is made mandatory, but tries to 
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make the Department of the Interior copy as much of its functionality as possible, 
and also believes that it does not really matter which technology is used. 
The safety region Gelderland Zuid-Oost has long worked together with the 
military to put out forest fires, and this partnership has been responsible for a very 
early transfer of netcentric work from the military to the civilian world. In the 
development phase of its IT system the safety region cooperated with Gelderland-
Midden and used ‘Eagle One’ based technology. After a while both regions 
decided that they had different preferences for functionality and abandoned the 
joint system development. Gelderland Zuid-Oost now has its own netcentric 
system, called ‘Command and Control System’ (CCS). CCS currently only has a 
Geographical Information System (GIS) and a chat function, but will soon be 
augmented with text functionality. As Gelderland Zuid-Oost will be combined 
with the neighbouring region of IJsselland in the near future, two regions will start 
working with CCS soon. 
Brabant-Noord is one of the few other regions next to Gelderland Zuid-
Oost already using netcentric work. It also adopted its netcentric work from the 
military. The region hosts a large air show, which necessitates co-operation with 
the air force. It is in this way that netcentric work, and the information system 
‘ISIS’ was transferred from the military to the regional civil authorities. 
Finally, a cluster of border regions has consciously developed its own 
netcentric work platform, because they need to be able to cooperate with 
emergency workers across the border. The border regions Zuid-Limburg, 
Limburg-Noord, Gelderland-Zuid and Twente have their own Internet-based 
system called ‘Safety Net’, which allows cooperation with Belgian and German 
emergency services. Because Safety Net does not require installing new software 
on computers, safety workers can access it from their private computers at home. 
 
Followers 
 
Some safety regions began introducing netcentric work when the Department of 
the Interior began introducing its plans. For example, the region Hollands Midden 
currently works with ‘Multiteam’, but will most likely change to Cedric, as Cedric 
is a mere extension of Multiteam. This region trains everybody involved, and does 
not worry about technological standards. Instead, it invests heavily in getting all 
the relevant functionaries in its 28 municipalities committed. It has prepared New 
Years Eve 2009 celebrations - which have a tendency to escalate into violence in 
the Netherlands - in the region using netcentric work, hence using it for policy 
making rather than execution. 
The region Kennemerland, of which Schiphol airport is part, is a 
competent follower as well. It is waiting to adopt the Department of the Interior’s 
netcentric IT-system. It has already appointed officers called ‘multi process 
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coordinators’ (MPCs), who manage the streams of information when emergencies 
happen. In the future this region will have specialized information managers at all 
levels of the organizations dealing with emergencies. 
Whereas in Hollands Midden people come first, the region Rotterdam-
Rijnmond puts technology first. This region has already hired information 
managers, as well as a functionary resembling the Kennemerland MPC. 
Interesting is that in this region netcentric work has also emerged spontaneously. 
During an exercise one of the operators involved used his cell phone to 
photograph an aerial picture of the site of a major incident (these types of pictures 
often decorate the walls in emergency response rooms). He transferred the photo 
to a laptop using Bluetooth, and imported it in the word processor Word, to be 
able to insert drawings in the picture. He then emailed it to his colleagues 
elsewhere, and very soon everybody was working netcentrically. 
 
Laggards 
 
Some safety regions still keep clear from netcentric work because of other 
priorities. For example, the region Zuid-Holland-Zuid is convinced that netcentric 
work should be part of daily routines, once it is introduced, and not just used in 
case of very large disasters, as these are simply too rare. Officials in the region 
feel that information-sharing and co-operation between the emergency services 
involved in current practices should be the real spearhead, not the struggle 
towards one new technological standard. Therefore, drawing up policy plans for 
multidisciplinary co-operation should be a first priority. 
Amsterdam-Amstelland is the only safety region in which the 
governmental organizations that should adopt netcentric work, the fire brigade, 
the medical teams and the police, are not yet working in one joint emergency 
response room (Boersma et al, 2009). That means that it is difficult for this region 
to find a place from which it can govern and co-ordinate netcentric operations. 
Only recently has the Amsterdam-Amstelland region decided to implement a 
netcentric work standard. 
 
The interpretative Flexibility of Netcentric Work 
 
What becomes clear is that netcentric work was already being implemented in 
some regions when the Department of the Interior first introduced the idea. 
Therefore, it is not just the IT-systems that vary. The driver behind these bottom-
up activities seen in a number of safety regions is their personnel who already 
communicated in their private lives in a ‘netcentric’ fashion (e.g. by the use of 
mobile applications), and naturally began applying that concept to their jobs, used 
social network software and other shared information platforms such as email and 
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Twitter. We can also see some important regional contingencies, such as civil-
military collaboration and cross-border incidents acting as important drivers for 
the bottom-up implementation. The reason most of the regions did not wait for the 
Department of the Interior to come up with something, was that it had simply 
failed to take the initiative in the earlier stages; furthermore, it had not supported 
the regions’ own netcentric activities wholeheartedly. 
As a result, there appear to be numerous - often mutually exclusive - 
definitions of netcentric work. According to some of our interviewees netcentric 
work is ‘an umbrella term for highly different practices and techniques’, or 
‘simply the new buzzword’. It is defined as ‘a clever intertwining of information 
systems to make direct communication between all emergency workers on all 
levels possible’; ‘a reorganization of the entire organization’; ‘a mindset, a change 
in culture’; ‘sharing information to enable the coming into being of a joint view of 
an incident’; ‘a way to facilitate decision-making’; or ‘just a way of managing 
information, but not a goal in itself’. 
Interviewees also differ on their view of the goal of netcentric work, which 
is defined as ‘speeding up decision-making by improving the dissemination of 
information’; ‘taking away bottlenecks in the flow of information’; ‘making 
information more reliable and timely’; ‘improving the sharing of information 
during the first hour of an incident’; ‘enabling the flow of information from the 
shop-floor to the decision-making levels of the emergency organizations during 
an incident’; ‘the sharing of decisions instead of information’; or ‘getting the 
relevant information to the right people at the right moment’. 
Views on the scope of netcentric work vary just as much. To some the 
emergency response rooms should be at the heart of netcentric work, as 
information clearing houses; to others, emergency response rooms should hardly 
have a role. Some interviewees hope that netcentric work will improve the flow of 
information between the executive and decision-making levels of the emergency 
organizations involved in a large emergency, others see it as a tool mainly for 
decision-makers. Then there are differences over involving outside parties in 
netcentric work, like the utility companies or the water boards for instance. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this article we have analyzed the introduction of netcentric work in the 
Netherlands at a national level. The problem is that with the introduction of one 
national system local solutions are neglected or seen as potential bottle necks for 
new ways of working. In the US, where solutions for the coordination problem 
are sought in information infrastructures at the national level as well, authorities 
are likely to run into similar problems. This makes it important to draw lessons 
from the Dutch case. The question is whether it is advisable to implement a 
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centralized technological solution, or whether to decentralize the system; the latter 
encourages a better adaptation to local circumstances, but risks fragmentation. 
Given the problematic situation that the civil safety organizations face 
during incidents and crisis in terms of information-sharing, it is no wonder that 
the new paradigm of netcentric work has been seen as a promising solution. 
Netcentric working means adopting information sharing practices through which 
the professionals can work towards a common operational picture at times of 
incidents and crisis. However, the interpretative flexibility of the netcentric work 
concept and the fragmentation of the safety sector makes the actual 
implementation of netcentric work (including its IT component) demanding rather 
than promising. 
As we have seen, netcentric work is reinterpreted and redefined constantly 
as it ‘travels’ through the safety sector in The Netherlands. Not only do the 
definitions, the goals, and the ways of implementation of netcentric work vary, 
but the technology turns out to be just as malleable. One of the reasons behind this 
constant (re)interpretation is that netcentric work travels in all directions. 
Emergency management is by definition a multi-organizational and multi-
jurisdictional environment, where each organization has its own interests in 
changing the system’s functionalities to suit local peculiarities. The 
implementation of Netcentric Work in the Netherlands has taught us that when a 
centralized system is implemented in a fragmented world of emergency 
management, the system is bound to disintegrate into local variations. 
Moreover, we know from information systems literature that when the 
system is actually put into use - a thing that has not yet happened with netcentric 
work in the Netherlands at the time of data collection - we need to consider other 
mechanisms as well. When systems are implemented, ‘structuration’ and ‘drift’ - 
the alteration of (the use of) the information systems under the influence of local 
operational practices - will soon cause diversification of the system (Ciborra 
2002; Orlikowski 2000). Therefore, even if one does succeed in getting local 
partners to accept a national information system, it will nonetheless gradually 
transform into local varieties on the shop-floor. During the observations in the 
safety regions we were confronted with the early stages of ‘structuration’ and 
‘drift’. Further research is needed to study what influence these processes have on 
the fragmentation in the safety sector and how these systems might be further 
adapted to local peculiarities once netcentric work is actually put into use, but 
clear is already that Mendonça, Jefferson, and Harrald (2007) need not fear too 
much. A national system will not go against local rationality for very long. In the 
end it will be adapted to it. 
The Dutch Department of the Interior itself can do very little about this 
situation. In this article we have seen that in an environment, where power and 
influence is fragmented, ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ do not work. The Department of the 
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Interior cannot impose its definition of netcentric work on the safety sectors by 
force or incentives, and is left only with the possibility of using ‘integration 
power’, or the ‘hug’. As it turns out, however, this type of power also has 
setbacks. The Department of the Interior has created a front-stage ‘trading zone’ 
(i.e. the Platform Netcentric Work), to create another ‘trading zone’ (i.e. what 
netcentric operations is actually about), which resulted in a multitude of local 
trading zones (i.e. all different local versions of netcentric work). Thus, 
paradoxically, the implementation of a system that should enable coordination 
between organizations eventually results in a diversification of systems. These 
then frustrate the coordination processes on a higher level, that is, the level of 
coordination between the safety regions. 
 
As said in the theoretical section, from the inter-organizational systems literature, 
the inter-governmental literature and the network governance literature it is well-
known already that the introduction of nation-wide IT infrastructures is 
complicated and challenging. Despite this large body of literature, we still see 
scholars and practitioners believing in the promising IT-infrastructures. 
Centralization – and the accompanying information systems – are still seen as 
solutions to the problems facing nowadays emergency management. With our 
contribution we would like to argue that it is naive to think that the top-down 
introduction of such systems will be the solution. Instead, we think that central 
government should not force the users of those systems in a certain direction. It 
can set the conditions for the introduction of IT-systems, and make sure that the 
different systems are compatible and able to ‘talk to each other’, but it should let 
the local end-users decide about functionalities and particularities. 
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